War About To Begin: The CCP is stepping up its invasion plans for Taiwan. They’re moving pieces into place a lot faster than before

China’s Military Buildup

• Naval and Air Forces: China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has developed one of the world’s largest navies, including advanced destroyers, aircraft carriers, and submarines. The PLA Navy has conducted large-scale exercises in the Taiwan Strait, simulating blockades and amphibious landings. For example, in December 2024, China staged its largest military exercises in three decades, involving 42 military aircraft, 15 navy ships, and 16 coast guard vessels.

• Amphibious Capabilities: Recent PLA exercises have incorporated civilian ferries capable of transporting tanks and personnel, suggesting preparations for amphibious operations. This dual-use strategy allows China to mask military activities under civilian guises.

• Air and Missile Power: The PLA Air Force regularly conducts sorties near Taiwan, with a record 3,070 military aircraft crossings of the Taiwan Strait’s median line in 2024. China’s Rocket Force, which controls its nuclear and conventional missiles, is also a focus of modernization, though recent purges have raised questions about its readiness.

• Coast Guard and Maritime Militia: China’s coast guard and maritime militia have been increasingly involved in exercises, practicing blockades and patrols near Taiwan’s outlying islands like Kinmen and Matsu. These actions are seen as efforts to establish a new status quo and pressure Taiwan.

• 2027 Timeline: U.S. officials and analysts often cite 2027 as a significant date, referencing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reported directive for the PLA to be capable of invading Taiwan by that year, coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s founding. However, this is described as an aspirational goal rather than a confirmed invasion deadline

• Political Rhetoric: Beijing has intensified its rhetoric, labeling Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te a “separatist” and accusing him of pushing Taiwan toward war. Chinese media have portrayed Lai’s policies, such as increasing defense resilience and reinstating military courts, as provocative.

• Military Exercises: China’s exercises, such as the “Joint Sword 2024A” drills, simulate blockades and invasions, often in response to Taiwanese or U.S. actions. These drills include coast guard and maritime militia participation, indicating a multi-domain approach.

• Outlying Islands: A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report warns that China could target Taiwan’s smaller islands, like Kinmen and Matsu, as a coercive tactic short of a full invasion. These islands are vulnerable due to their proximity to the Chinese mainland.
• White Paper and Threats: A May 2025 Chinese white paper explicitly mentioned a “Decapitation Operation” as a potential strategy, signaling a willingness to escalate if provoked, particularly in response to U.S. actions like increased arms sales to Taiwan.

• U.S. Defense Posture: U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has warned that a Chinese invasion could be “imminent,” citing China’s military drills as rehearsals for a full-scale operation. The Pentagon has prioritized deterring a Chinese invasion, with strategies like creating a “hellscape” of drones and mines in the Taiwan Strait to slow a Chinese advance.

• Taiwan’s Preparations: Taiwan is bolstering its defenses with U.S. support, including HIMARS testing and drone development, though its drone stockpile (around 1,000) is considered inadequate. Taiwan’s military exercises, like the Han Kuang drills, simulate responses to a Chinese invasion.

• Allied Concerns: Japan, particularly its southern islands like Yonaguni, is preparing for a potential Taiwan conflict, viewing it as a regional security threat. Japan is doubling its defense budget by 2027. The Philippines and other U.S. allies are also increasing cooperation to counter China’s assertiveness in the region

• China’s Denials: Chinese officials, like Zhou Bo, a former PLA senior colonel, assert that military drills are not indicative of imminent invasion plans but are meant to deter Taiwanese independence movements and signal strength. Beijing emphasizes a preference for “peaceful reunification.”

• Internal Challenges: Recent purges in the PLA, including high-ranking officers like Gen. He Weidong, suggest internal instability and potential weaknesses in readiness, which could delay or complicate any invasion plans. Corruption and organizational issues may hinder China’s ability to execute a complex operation like a Taiwan invasion.

• Economic Costs: A conflict over Taiwan would have severe economic consequences for China, including disruptions to global trade and its own economy. This is a significant deterrent, as noted by Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo.

• Strategic Ambiguity: The U.S. maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity, not explicitly committing to defend Taiwan but providing significant military support. Recent polls in Taiwan show declining confidence in U.S. intervention, with only 14% believing the U.S. would “definitely” intervene in a conflict.

• Risk of Miscalculation: Escalating tensions, driven by U.S.-China trade disputes and Taiwan’s defense buildup, increase the risk of miscalculation. For example, U.S. arms sales and naval transits through the Taiwan Strait have provoked strong Chinese responses.

• Taiwanese Sentiment: Many Taiwanese, especially younger generations, prefer maintaining the status quo over provoking conflict or pursuing formal independence. Polls indicate most do not expect an invasion within the next five years, despite heightened rhetoric.